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Introduction 
There is a fundamental puzzle in understanding our awareness of the visual world. On one hand, our 
subjective experience is one of a rich visual world, which we perceive effortlessly. However, when we 
actually test perception, observers know surprisingly little (Figure 1). A number of tasks, from search, 
through inattentional blindness, to change blindness, suggest that there is surprisingly little awareness 
or perception without attention (e.g. Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Mack and Rock, 1998; Rensink, 
O’Regan, and Clark, 1997). Meanwhile, another set of tasks, such as multiple object tracking (MOT), 
dual-task performance, and visual working memory (VWM) tasks suggest that both attention and 
working memory have low capacity (e.g. Scimeca and Franconeri, 2015; VanRullen, Reddy, and Koch, 
2004; Luck and Vogel, 2013). These two components together – poor perception without attention, and 
greatly limited capacity for attention and memory – imply that perception is impoverished. Throughout, 
I refer to this combination of rich subjective experience and poor task performance as “the awareness 
puzzle,” though of course it is far from the only puzzle when it comes to understanding awareness. 
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Figure 1. The awareness puzzle. A. Our subjective impressions of a real scene appear rich and full of 
detail. B. However, when tested in the lab, observers know surprisingly little. Visual search (top left), 
inattentional blindness (top middle), and change blindness (top right) all imply poor perception 
without attention. A number of other tasks (bottom: multiple object tracking, dual-task experiments, 
and visual working memory tasks) suggest that both attention and memory have low capacity.  
How can we make sense of this awareness puzzle, of the riddle of our rich subjective experience coupled 
with poor performance on experimental tasks? Philosophers and researchers have offered two main 
theories. The first, here referred to as the “illusion theory”, suggests that the rich subjective impression 
is merely an illusion, and therefore not incompatible with the impoverished perception observed in 
behavioral experiments. (Blackmore et al., 1995; Dennett, 1991, 1998; O’Regan, 1992; Rensink et al., 
1997).   
The second theory, here referred to as the “inaccessible theory” suggests that we are perversely aware 
of more than we can act upon (Block, 2011; Lamme, 2010). The rich percept is real, but the information 
is inaccessible when it comes to making decisions or otherwise taking action.  
I will suggest that both of these theories have pinpointed interesting parts of the problem, but have not 
provided the solution to the awareness puzzle. My main claim is that, looked at in the right way, there is 
in fact no awareness puzzle. In particular, I will argue that the tasks that show limits are inherently 
difficult tasks, and that there exists a unified explanation for both the rich subjective experience and the 
apparent limits. Everyone in this symposium (Vision Sciences Society, St. Petersburg, FL, May 2017) has 
suggested some aspects of this story (Balas, Nakano, and Rosenholtz, 2009; Haberman and Whitney, 
2009, 2011; Rosenholtz, 2011; Rosenholtz, Huang, and Ehinger, 2012; Cohen, Dennett, and Kanwisher, 
2016; Leib, Kosovicheva, and Whitney, 2016; Rosenholtz, 2017), as have others in vision science (Ariely, 
2001; Oliva & Torralba, 2006; Alvarez, 2011). Here I clarify previously suggested aspects of the solution, 
and suggest other key components for understanding the awareness puzzle. 
Revisiting the evidence for impoverished vision, part I 
So, let us begin by discussing the evidence for impoverished vision. In particular, I begin by discussing 
visual search and change blindness. I leave discussion of MOT, VWM, and related phenomena to a later 
section, as I will argue that those phenomena predominantly expose different factors than search and 
change blindness. I have recently discussed inattentional blindness and dual-task performance in more 
detail (Rosenholtz, 2017), and therefore while I describe their place in the story I largely leave those 
details to that paper. 
Visual search may not provide evidence for impoverished vision 
In the traditional view of visual search, search experiments probe limits of attention. Some amount of 
processing can occur “preattentively” in parallel across the visual field. Then, at some stage of 
processing, attention serially selects some portion of the input for higher-level processing. By comparing 
conditions that lead to difficult vs. easy visual search, we can supposedly determine at what stage 
selection occurs, and what processing is preattentive.  
Experiments have generally shown that search is difficult whenever distinguishing the search target 
from other distractor items requires more than a simple basic feature like color or motion. This implies 
that only basic features – often referred to as “feature maps” – can be computed preattentively, and 
selection occurs early in visual processing. Because attention is a limited resource, this implies that 
vision is highly impoverished. 
However, my lab has argued that we need to rethink the logic of search experiments and their 
implications for attention and the richness of perception (Rosenholtz et al., 2012ab; Zhang et al., 2015). 
We have shown that peripheral discriminability of a target-present from a target-absent patch predicts 
search performance (Figure 2). This suggests that search primarily pinpoints loss of information in 
peripheral vision, not attentional limits nor limits of preattentive processing. 
One might ask why this distinction matters, since in both cases there would seem to be a loss of 
information, whether from the regions not fixated or from unattended regions, and therefore at first 
glance either system would appear to suggest impoverished vision. However, a peripheral vision 
explanation implies much less impoverished vision than the attentional explanation. In the attention 
explanation, unselected stimuli receive no processing after the bottleneck of attention. This means that 
many, if not most, tasks are impossible without attention. Peripheral vision, on the other hand, has 
simply lost information that happens to make difficult search hard. However, it also preserves a great 
deal of information (as we have proven, and will discuss in a later subsection). Most crucially, processing 
continues! One cannot recover the lost information without an eye movement, but the information that 
remains supports performance of many tasks, from guiding eye movements, through object recognition, 
to getting the gist of a scene and navigating the world.  
Change blindness may not provide evidence for impoverished vision 
Change blindness refers to the difficulty detecting a change to an image. In the lab, the experimental 
paradigm often involves flickering between two versions of an image, while introducing a brief blank 
frame between the pair in order to disrupt motion cues. The phenomenon itself is essentially the same 
as the childhood puzzle in which one must find the differences between two side-by-side images.  
Many researchers have viewed change blindness as probing the limits of perception without attention. 
(Researchers have also offered a memory explanation for change blindness, of less relevance for the 
present discussion.) Supposedly, the observer manipulates a spotlight of attention, and perception is 
richer within that spotlight than outside of it. The difficulty of detecting a change implies that little 
perception occurs without attention.  
However, peripheral vision is a factor in change blindness. We first categorized standard change 
blindness stimuli as easy, medium and hard, based on time to detect the changes (Figure 3). We then 
measured difficulty detecting a known and presumably attended change using peripheral vision. We 
found that for the hard changes, observers needed to fixate significantly closer to the change in order to 
perceive it, even though they knew in advance the identity of the change and its location (Sharan et al., 
under review). 
 
Figure 2. Search performance vs. peripheral discriminability. For a range of classic search conditions, 
greater peripheral discriminability d’ leads to more efficient search, i.e. lower search slopes. 
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Once again, a peripheral vision explanation implies that perception is richer than previously thought. 
The information lost in peripheral vision just happens to make it hard to detect changes. (This may not 
be due to chance. Researchers tend to design experiments with “interesting” changes, and the changes 
dubbed “uninteresting” may be easier to detect in peripheral vision.) However, peripheral vision 
preserves a great deal of information, which could support a wide range of tasks. Again, I discuss this in 
more detail in the following subsection.  
Peripheral vision encoding preserves a great deal of information 
We have argued elsewhere, for roughly the last decade, that peripheral vision encodes its inputs in 
terms of a rich set of image statistics. These statistics are “summary statistics”, meaning they pool 
information over sizeable local regions that grow with the distance to the point of fixation, i.e. the 
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Figure 3. Peripheral vision is a factor in change blindness. A. Observers discriminated known changes 
in an A-B-X paradigm that requires them to identify whether the final image matches the first or the 
second one in the sequence. Fixation was enforced at various distances to the change. Orange circle 
shows one such fixation. The difference for this sequence was in the pattern on the ground. B. The 
threshold eccentricity (distance to the change) for easy-, medium-, and hard-to-detect changes. 
Harder changes require closer fixation to be discriminated. 
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Figure 4. Information encoded in a rich set of image statistics. A. Original image, candidate pooling 
regions superimposed. They grow linearly with eccentricity. B. Image synthesized to have the same 
local image statistics as the original. This encoding captures a great deal of information, though some 
of the details of the image are unclear. 
+ 
eccentricity. We have discussed our candidate image statistics elsewhere, and so do not go into detail 
here. This encoding leads to significant loss of information, and we have accumulated extensive 
evidence that this loss of information can predict difficulty recognizing peripheral objects, particularly in 
cluttered displays or scenes (Balas et al., 2009; Rosenholtz et al., 2012b; Zhang et al., 2015; Chang & 
Rosenholtz, 2016; Keshvari & Rosenholtz, 2016). The loss of information predicts difficult search 
conditions, while preserving the information necessary to predict easy “popout” search (Rosenholtz et 
al., 2012b; Zhang et al., 2015; Chang & Rosenholtz, 2016).  
Nonetheless, this encoding preserves a great deal of information. It preserves sufficient information to 
predict human performance getting the gist of the scene, including scene category, upcoming turns, 
presence of a particular object like an animal or a stop sign, and what city appears in the photograph 
(Rosenholtz et al., 2012a; Ehinger & Rosenholtz, 2016). To get a sense of what information is encoded by 
a rich set of image statistics such as those proposed, one can synthesize images that contain the same 
statistics but are otherwise random (Rosenholtz, 2011; Freeman & Simoncelli, 2011; Rosenholtz et al., 
2012a; Ehinger & Rosenholtz, 2016). As shown in Figure 4, this encoding preserves a great deal of 
information. That it does so is not surprising, as this scheme involves a large number of image statistics; 
as many as 1000 per pooling region. While we know surprisingly little about the information available in 
our rich subjective impression of the world, it seems plausible that this encoding scheme has sufficient 
information to support that subjective impression. 
Examining Figure 4, however, it is clear that the encoding does not preserve certain details. One cannot 
read the Thomson Rd. sign, nor easily discriminate the number and types of vehicles. This ambiguity of 
the details could underlie poor performance in change detection experiments. Figure 5 shows a demo of 
this same synthesis technique applied to a pair of change detection images. When fixating 5 degrees 
away from the change, the model predicts difficulty detecting the change. However when fixating 1 
 
Figure 5. Summary image statistics lose information about the details, which can lead to difficult 
change detection. A. Image pair. Red bars indicate changed region. B. Synthesis visualizes the 
information available in a summary statistic encoding for a fixation 5 degrees (left) and 1 degree 
(right) from the change. Note that the change is clear in the latter pair, but not the former.  
degree away, the change becomes clear, in agreement with our data on change discrimination in the 
periphery (Sharan et al., under review). 
Humans are also quite good at reporting the ensemble properties of a set of objects. This includes low-
level properties like the mean and variance of orientation or size, as well as higher-level properties such 
as mean facial expression. According to traditional theories of vision, such performance is surprising, as 
how could observers report the mean when extracting features of individual items requires attention. In 
fact, observers are poor at reporting the features of a particular item. However, in opposition to such 
theories, it is worth noting that no studies, to my knowledge, have found that observers are better at 
reporting the mean than one would expect from their ability to report whether a given feature was 
present anywhere in the display. In other words, observers have difficulty reporting the identity of a 
particular post-cued item, but seem to have access to something like a histogram of the features in the 
display. 
As shown in Figure 6, a rich set of image statistics preserves sufficient information to support a wide 
variety of ensemble perception tasks. Sizes and orientations of items are largely preserved, but location 
information is lost; the lost information perhaps partially explains the difficulty reporting a particular 
item’s identity. In addition, one can tell that the items on the right are oriented dark bars on a light 
background, and those on the left are black and white quadrisected disks against a gray background.  
Authors often confuse image statistics with ensemble statistics of a set of items, so it is worth noting 
that the large set of image statistics can support perception of scenes and sets, but research has not 
demonstrated that a handful of ensemble statistics can support rich scene perception. 
Revisiting the evidence for impoverished vision, part II 
It should already seem plausible from this discussion that there is no awareness puzzle. The same 
encoding of the visual input seems likely to predict the difference between easy and difficult visual 
search, the difference between easy and difficult change detection, to predict perception of the gist of 
scenes and sets of items, and to preserve enough information to support a rich subjective experience of 
the visual world.  
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Figure 6. Summary statistic encoding can underlie the richness of ensemble perception. These 
syntheses visualizing the encoded information rely on information from only a single pooling region, 
leading to greater loss of location information than with the full version of the model.  
However, Figure 1 referred to other perceptual phenomena not readily explained by a summary statistic 
encoding. These include inattentional blindness, the difficulty in performing two tasks at once, MOT, and 
the limited capacity of visual working memory. Though many of these tasks may, in part, be explained by 
a summary statistic encoding in peripheral vision, it is clear for most of these tasks that that cannot be 
the entire explanation. Encoding losses in peripheral vision particularly affect vision in cluttered or 
complex displays, which certainly applies to typical displays for these tasks. However, researchers have 
in some cases controlled for fixation and clutter and still found poor performance at these tasks. 
I argue that this second group of tasks is inherently difficult. Consider, as a canonical example, a typical 
VWM task. An observer is shown an array of k items, such as colored disks. After viewing this array for 
some time, the experimenter then shows another array. This array either duplicates the original, or 
differs, often in the color of one of the k disks. In the traditional way of thinking of this task, the 
observer has n memory slots to fill with features from each of the k disks. Based on how performance 
varies as a function of the number of items in the display, one can supposedly infer the number of slots. 
Based on this logic, researchers have concluded that a typical observer has only around 4 slots; this 
suggests a very limited capacity for VWM.  
This slots framework, however, makes many assumptions about how VWM works. If we think of the task 
at a more basic level, the observer must discriminate between the array to be remembered and all other 
arrays with at least one change. One could imagine that this discrimination would require a fairly 
complicated classifier. Just how complicated would depend upon the feature space on which the 
classifier operates. The feature space seems unlikely to be a vector of k colors. Put another way, the 
arrays of colored disks likely occupy a very small subset of “perceptual space” – the images one is likely 
to see, represented in whatever high-dimensional encoding used by the visual system. Discriminating 
between such similar images might be quite difficult. 
A very similar story applies to tasks such as reporting a post-cued member of an ensemble. This task is 
essentially a version of the VWM task, and is likely hard for the same reason. MOT tasks are inherently 
difficult for a somewhat different reason. Again, in the traditional interpretation, the visual system has 
m attentional spotlights to deploy. Based on performance one can infer m, and as m is low, one 
concludes that attention has limited capacity. However, as with VWM, this account makes strong 
assumptions about the mechanisms involved. At a more basic level, if the observer must track k of n 
items, then on each frame they must distinguish the actual k targets from n-choose-k other possible 
combinations of targets. In the case of tracking 4 of 9 items, for instance, the observer must distinguish 
the actual 4 targets from 125 other possibilities! One might again imagine that this task is inherently 
difficult in the abstract, though of course motion cues can make the task more tractable.  
The inherent difficulty of these tasks, almost independent of the underlying representation, suggests 
that they target decision-level mechanisms. I have recently made a similar argument that inattentional 
blindness, dual-task performance, and likely search and change blindness may all encounter decision-
level limits as well as encoding limits, and point the reader to that recent paper rather than reiterating 
the arguments here (Rosenholtz, 2017). 
The promise of a unifying explanation, and thoughts on a remaining puzzle 
I have suggested, then, the following general mechanism underlying perception and awareness (Figure 
7). First, a number of stages of processing compute a perceptual encoding of the visual input. Losses in 
this encoding lead to poor performance on a number of visual tasks (difficult search, change blindness), 
while preserving sufficient information to make other tasks relatively easy (easy search, and getting the 
gist of a scene or set), and perhaps to support our rich subjective percept of the world. Information may 
be lost at a number of the stages of perceptual processing. A particularly interesting loss appears to be 
an encoding in terms of a rich set of summary image statistics, derived from pooling image 
measurements across sizeable regions of the visual field, which grow with distance from the point of 
gaze. My lab has demonstrated that this loss alone explains a surprising number of visual phenomena. 
Nonetheless, processing continues beyond that stage of processing, and to the extent that necessary 
information survives, the observer can perceive groups, reason about materials and shape, recognize 
objects, and get the gist of a scene. However, ultimately performance on a task depends upon decision 
(inference) processes operating on the perceptual encoding. Some tasks (MOT, VWM, dual-task, etc.) 
may be difficult because they are inherently difficult given the encoding, and/or the decision processes 
may themselves have limits, e.g. on the allowable complexity of the inference (Rosenholtz, 2017).  
 
Figure 7. Hypothesized architecture underlying “awareness puzzle” phenomena. See text. 
If there exists a single model that predicts the phenomena underlying the puzzle of awareness then 
there is no puzzle. The tasks that appear to show limits are simply hard tasks, either due to the encoding 
or due to limits on inference processes. The same system may predict that a great deal of information is 
available to support a rich subjective experience. 
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While the discussion so far seems promising, I have tricked the reader a bit; a puzzle remains. I have said 
that the summary statistic encoding preserves sufficient information to provide a rich subjective 
impression. However, presumably this subjective impression, too, derives from the visual system 
performing some task, which in turn is subject to limits on the inference processes. Does that inference 
process, too, support a rich subjective impression? Put another way, why is the “task” that leads to a 
rich subjective impression somehow easier than the task of tracking more than 4 objects?  
This remaining puzzle sounds disturbingly reminiscent of the “inaccessible theory” of visual awareness: 
why is it that when the experimenter does not probe the observer with a task, the “inference” of a rich 
percept is easy to acquire, and yet when there is an experimenter-defined task (MOT, VWM, etc.), the 
task encounters limits? It could be that there is a distinction between having a concrete task and simply 
getting an impression of the scene – declarative vs. episodic perception, to parallel a similar distinction 
between different types of memory. However, having come this far, I think we do not have to give up 
quite yet.  
Suppose we hypothesize that one can operationalize the task of getting a subjective impression in the 
following way: The visual system attempts to answer the question, “where does this stimulus lie in 
perceptual encoding space?” If the visual system lacks precision in answering this question, either due to 
encoding or inference limits, then this will lead to uncertainty about the stimulus. To get a sense of what 
this uncertainty might mean, we performed a mini-experiment as follows: 
We took as our candidate perceptual encoding the last representational layer (the “last fully connected 
layer”) of a convolutional neural network (CNN). CNNs have recently become very popular, as for the 
first time they allow computer vision to approach human performance on certain proscribed visual 
tasks. Researchers have also shown certain similarities between the representations learned by CNNs 
and those found in monkey physiology (Yamins et al., 2014). We used a CNN known as VGG-16, trained 
to perform invariant object recognition (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014). (Note that this encoding is not 
foveated. Despite the importance of peripheral vision for understanding many relevant perceptual 
phenomena, for this mini-experiment we use an encoding that does not depend upon distance from the 
point of gaze.) We then took a set of arrays of 8 colored squares (Figure 8A), and measured the distance 
between them in the VGG-16 perceptual encoding space. This gives us a measure of the uncertainty in 
pinpointing images in perceptual encoding space. Humans have difficulty distinguishing these arrays in a 
VWM task, suggesting they have at least this much uncertainty. Given that same uncertainty, how well 
could we instead pinpoint a natural scene? Figure 8B shows scenes with approximately the same 
discriminability in VGG-16 space as the VWM displays. Figure 8C shows scenes that are more 
discriminable from this set.  
The first thing to note from these results is that a distance metric applied to the last fully connected 
layer of VGG-16 seems to give us a reasonable measure of perceptual similarity. It is difficult to 
distinguish the arrays of colored squares from each other, and it is similarly difficult to distinguish the 
scenes in Figure 8B. The camera angle has changed somewhat, and the location of the number of 
vehicles and pedestrians has changed. The scenes in Figure 8C are more readily discriminated from 
those in Figure 8B. So the mini-experiment is a good first attempt. More importantly, note that for the 
same amount of uncertainty that makes an 8-item VWM task hard, one can pinpoint a scene fairly well. 
In a plausible perceptual encoding space, the same precision can specify either an array of about 8 items  
 of random color and position, or mostly determine the scene, plus or minus some small changes. This 
suggests there is real hope for a unified explanation. The same inference limits that make VWM difficult 
allow a rich subjective experience of the real world. There is no need for information available in the rich 
subjective experience to be perversely unavailable for decision-making and action. 
Conclusions 
I have argued that perception results from limited inference processes, acting upon a perceptual 
encoding that has lost information, particularly from the peripheral visual field (Rosenholtz, 2017). A 
dominant source of lost information derives from encoding the visual input in terms of a rich set of 
summary image statistics. That perception results from inference suggests that there is some truth to 
the “illusion” theories of awareness. One perceives the results of inference, not some image projected in 
the head and viewed by the self. Perception is inherently something of an illusion. However, the illusion 
is not as extreme as previously thought, because vision is not so impoverished. Rather, tasks that seem 
to show impoverished vision are simply harder tasks than getting a rich impression of the world. Looked 
at in the right way, with the right model in hand, there is no awareness puzzle. 
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